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Administrative Agencies: A Comparison of New 
Hampshire and Federal Agencies’ History, Structure and 
Rulemaking Requirements 
SCOTT F. JOHNSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this day and age it is difficult to think of anything that is not 
regulated in some way by a state or federal agency.  State and federal 
agencies routinely make decisions that impact our daily lives.  The air we 
breathe, the water we drink, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, and the 
places where we live and work are all regulated to some extent.  
Agencies sometimes regulate things in ways that lead to strange 
results.  For example, New Hampshire, state regulations allow anyone to 
own a yak, a bison, a wild boar, or an emu, but do not permit a person to 
own a capuchin monkey unless that person is an “exhibitor” of animals.1  
This may not seem like a big deal, but the result of this restriction is that 
people with disabilities cannot possess a capuchin monkey as a service 
animal unless they qualify as an “exhibitor.”2  
Most people with disabilities that need a capuchin monkey as a service 
animal will not meet the “exhibitor” requirements.  They don’t intend to 
exhibit the animal; they just need the animal to help them with daily 
activities.3  Therefore, the result of the agency’s rules is that people in New 
Hampshire are able to possess yaks or wild boar with little or no agency 
  
 *   Visiting Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center; Professor of Law, Concord Law School; 
J.D. Franklin Pierce Law Center. 
     1.  See N.H. Code Admin. R. Fis. 803.02, 803.06 (2006).  An “Exhibitor” is “any person engaged in 
the showing, displaying or training of wildlife for the purpose of public viewing of the wildlife whether 
or not a fee is collected, and who possesses a current United States Department of Agriculture exhibi-
tor’s permit or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service permit to exhibit.”  Id. at 801.07.  
 2. Capuchin monkeys are often trained to be service animals to assist people with disabilities in 
performing a variety of daily tasks.  See generally Helping Hands: Monkey Helpers for the Disabled, 
Welcome to Helping Hands: Monkey Helpers for the Disabled!, http://www.helpinghandsmonkeys.org 
(accessed May 22, 2006).  New Hampshire’s rules do not provide for any accommodations for people 
with disabilities to obtain these animals.  
 3. Obtaining the permits to become an exhibitor is a very detailed and burdensome process.  There 
are a myriad of requirements that must be met.  N.H. Code Admin. R. Fis. 810.02; see generally U.S. 
Dept. of Agric., Licensing and Registration Under the Animal Welfare Act Guidelines for Dealers, 
Exhibitors, Transporters, and Researchers, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/awlicreg/awlicreg.pdf (ac-
cessed May 22, 2006). 
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oversight, but cannot possess an animal that will bring great benefit to their 
daily lives. 
This article discusses where New Hampshire and federal agencies 
obtain the authority to make agency rules or regulations, and the 
similarities and differences in the way they make them.  This article also 
compares the way that New Hampshire and federal agencies are structured 
and controlled by the executive and legislative branches of government.  
II.  FEDERAL AGENCIES 
A. History and Development – Evolving from a Sewer Commission 
The emergence of federal administrative agencies is often associated 
with President Roosevelt’s New Deal Era, but federal departments and 
agencies have been around since the beginning of our Nation.  The 
Departments of State, War and Treasury were all established in 1789 as 
part of President Washington’s Cabinet.4  The first two federal agencies 
were also created in 1789; one to “estimate the duties payable” on imports, 
and the other to adjudicate claims to military pensions for “invalids who 
were wounded and disabled during the late war.” 5  
The creation of these departments and agencies met some resistance, 
mostly over the specifics of what authority the departments and agencies 
would have, and over the appointment and removal of the department and 
agency heads.  The idea of having the departments and agencies was itself 
not controversial.6  This is likely because the Constitutional Framers and 
subsequent First Congress were familiar with agencies from English law 
and colonial governance.   
Under English law, agencies began with “sewer commissioners” in the 
13th century.7  The King established these commissioners, and they di-
rected the draining of English wetlands.  A statute in 1478 formally author-
ized the commissioners and gave them the powers of courts, and of inquiry 
and administration.  When the commissioners were ultimately used to in-
crease the land holdings of aristocrats, the process of supervising and re-
viewing the work of the commissioners became necessary.  That started an 
  
 4. David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of 
Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 161, 195-208 (1995). 
 5. James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1041, 
1044-45 (1975). 
 6. Currie, supra n. 4, at 195-208; Freedman, supra n. 5, at 1044-46. 
 7. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, 1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 1.3 (2d ed., West 
2005). 
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evolution of English administrative law that later found its way to the 
colonies.8 
The United States Constitution itself anticipates the need for adminis-
trative agencies.  Article II, Section 2 expressly recognizes that there will 
be “executive departments” and that the President can demand written 
opinions from the “principal officer” of these departments.  Section 2 also 
provides the President with the authority to appoint “Officers of the United 
States” with the advice and consent of the Senate, and provides Congress 
with the authority to give “Heads of Departments” the ability to appoint 
“inferior officers.”9  
From 1789 to the Civil War, a handful of additional agencies were cre-
ated.  The subsequent creation of the Civil Service Commission in 1883, 
and the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, is regarded by many as 
the point at which the administrative process officially came of age in the 
United States.10  The New Deal, or Roosevelt Era, is recognized as the 
period during which federal agencies became widespread.11  
During the New Deal era of the 1930’s, President Roosevelt and 
Congress created a number of federal agencies to oversee governmental 
programs intended to help the country recover from the Depression.  
Agencies included the National Recovery Administration, the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), the Social Security Administration, and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).12 
The expansion of the federal government through administrative agen-
cies was met with resistance from various fronts.  Agencies like the NLRB 
and SEC were opposed by business owners and others who objected to the 
efforts of the agencies to regulate labor and the exchange of capital.13  
Some New Deal initiatives were met with federal court challenges.  The 
United States Supreme Court ultimately determined that some agencies, or 
programs within the agencies, were unconstitutional because Congress did 
not provide sufficient parameters to define what these agencies or pro-
grams were supposed to do.14  
  
 8. Id. 
 9. See John H. Reese & Richard H. Seamon, Administrative Law, Principles and Practice 7 (2d 
ed., West 2003). 
 10. Freedman, supra n. 5, at 1045.  “About one-third of the federal administrative agencies were 
created before 1900, and another third before 1930.”  Id.  (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise vol. 1, § 1.04, 24 (West 1958). 
 11. Davis, supra n. 10, at 27. 
 12. Id. 
 13. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New 
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1563-65 (1996). 
 14. Id. 
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Congress also began to exercise more control over federal agency ac-
tions.  In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) to place some limits and consistency on federal agency actions.15  
One of the sponsors of the APA called the law “a bill of rights for the 
hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or 
regulated” by federal agencies.16  The law today is still a mainstay of the 
federal administrative process and provides a number of standards that 
federal agencies must follow when making regulations.17 
Some contend that the APA has not adequately controlled federal 
agencies and has instead paved the way for the modern regulatory state that 
we live under today.  This has been accomplished by giving agencies broad 
freedom to create and implement policies in the many areas those agencies 
control, and by providing only weak procedural requirements and judicial 
review standards to protect individuals.18   
Today, there are fifteen federal departments.  Each department has a 
myriad of federal agencies located within it and each agency has a number 
of divisions, sections, or bureaus that oversee particular areas within the 
jurisdiction of the agency.  There are also numerous independent agencies 
that exist outside of the federal departments. 
B.  Federal Agency Creation and Structure 
Federal administrative agencies are generally established by Congress 
through statutes referred to as “enabling statutes” or “organic statutes.”  
Agencies are generally created to act as agents for the executive branch.19  
There are generally two types of federal agencies: dependent and 
independent.  A dependent federal agency is part of one of the fifteen 
federal departments that make up the President’s Cabinet.  These 
departments, and the dependent agencies within them, are headed by a 
person appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  That person then serves at the pleasure of the President, meaning 
  
 15. Id.; see also Charles A. Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure – Evolu-
tion of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 32 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Judicial Review § 8134 (West 
2006). 
 16. David H. Rosenbloom, Framing a Lasting Congressional Response to the Administrative State, 
50 Admin. L. Rev. 173, 178 (1998); Shepherd, supra n. 13, at 1558. 
 17. Koch, supra n. 7, at § 2.32. 
 18. See Shepherd, supra n. 13, at 1558. 
 19. A few agencies are part of the legislative branch.  These include the Government Accountability 
Office, the Library of Congress, and the Government Printing Office.  The United States Sentencing 
Commission is an agency that is part of the judicial branch. 
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the President can remove the department or agency head for any reason, or 
for none whatsoever.20 
Departments and dependent agencies are influenced and controlled by 
the President in a variety of ways.  Additional mechanisms of executive 
control over agencies include control over the agency’s budget through a 
centralized budgeting process within the executive branch’s Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”), and the ability to issue executive 
orders requiring departments and dependent agencies to take or refrain 
from taking certain actions.21  
One of the best known executive orders is President Clinton’s 
Executive Order No. 12866 requiring departments and dependent federal 
agencies to develop bi-annual regulatory plans and to consider certain 
factors when developing regulations. 22  A division of the OMB, called the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, reviews regulations to 
ensure compliance with the requirements of the executive order.23 
Independent agencies fall into two categories: (1) independent 
executive branch agencies; and (2) independent regulatory agencies.  
Independent executive branch agencies, sometimes called “freestanding” 
executive agencies, are very much like dependent agencies.  Because they 
are part of the executive branch, the only real difference in terms of 
structure is that they are not located within one of the fifteen federal 
departments.  The President has essentially the same means of oversight 
and control of these independent executive agencies as he does over 
dependent agencies.24  Well-known examples of independent executive 
branch agencies include the Social Security Administration and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), though the EPA has been 
given “cabinet-level rank” by Presidents Clinton and Bush.25  
Independent regulatory agencies are structured differently.  They are 
not technically part of the executive branch and have no official 
  
 20. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative Law § 15.3-4 (2d ed., 
West 2001). 
 21. See id. at § 15.1. 
 22. See generally Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 15.1; William F. Fox, Jr., Understanding 
Administrative Law § 7.06 (4th ed., Lexis 2000); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing 
the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1995). This executive order was actually a continuation 
in many respects of prior executive orders issued by Presidents Carter and Reagan.  Id. 
 23. See Fox, supra n. 22, at § 7.06; Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 15.1. 
 24. See Fox, supra n. 22, at § 1.03. 
 25. Cabinet-level rank means that while the Department is not officially part of the President’s 
Cabinet, the Secretary of Administrator of the department is permitted to attend Cabinet meetings.  
Other cabinet-level officials or departments include the Vice President, the OMB, the United States 
Trade Representative and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  See The White House, President 
Bush’s Cabinet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/cabinet.html (accessed May 22, 2006). 
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constitutional home.26  As a result, they are not subject to the same formal 
supervision or control by the President.  For example, independent 
regulatory agencies are generally governed by multi-member panels that 
have set terms in office.  While the members are still appointed by a 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, their terms may 
outlast a current President’s term.  They can generally be removed prior to 
the expiration of their term only “for cause” as defined in the enabling 
statute of their particular agency.27  Furthermore, it is generally accepted 
that independent regulatory agencies are not required to comply with the 
President’s executive orders, although they may do so voluntarily.28 
Examples of independent regulatory agencies include the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”), the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), and the SEC.  Presidents do still exercise considerable control 
over independent regulatory agencies.  As noted, they appoint the multi-
member panels that govern independent agencies and they influence the 
agencies’ budget through OMB.29  
C.  Separation of Powers – Delegation of Legislative Authority  
Congress can provide a federal agency (dependent or independent) 
with various types of authority.  Some common examples include the 
ability to make regulations (also referred to as rules), the ability to 
investigate matters within the jurisdiction of the agency, and the ability to 
enforce laws or regulations through adjudication or other means.30  This 
article focuses on agency authority to make or promulgate regulations.  
 Agency regulations have the force and effect of law.  This raises 
constitutional separation of powers issues regarding the ability of Congress 
to delegate the authority to make laws to the executive branch, even though 
the normal constitutional role of the executive branch is to enforce the laws 
that Congress makes.31  
  
 26. See Koch, supra n. 7, at § 7.11. 
 27. William F. Funk et al., Administrative Procedure and Practice 12 (2d ed., West 2001); Fox, 
supra n. 22, at § 1.03. 
 28. Pildes & Sunstein, supra n. 22, at 15 (1995); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Gov-
ernment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 669 (1984); see also 
Fox, supra n. 22, at § 3.04[b] (discussing a Department of Justice Memorandum positing that inde-
pendent regulatory agencies might be forced to comply with executive orders if the Supreme Court 
would repudiate dicta in the Humphrey’s Executor case, but that trying to do so would trigger a con-
frontation with Congress that Presidents have not wanted to create). 
 29. Freedman, supra n. 5, at 1062. 
 30. Federal agencies can do a wide range of other things as well, like issuing licenses or permits, 
administering benefits programs, or administering other types of programs.  For example, NASA 
administers the nation’s space program.  See generally, Funk, supra n. 27, at 13-22. 
 31. The United States Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States[.]”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
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The Supreme Court addressed this issue in a number of cases and held 
that Congress may constitutionally delegate responsibility to create regula-
tions with the force of law to administrative agencies as long as Congress 
establishes an “intelligible principle” that limits the decision-making power 
of the agency.32  Under this standard, Congress must clearly delineate the 
general policy, the public agency which is to apply the policy, and the 
boundaries of the delegated authority.33  The court distinguishes between 
“the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves dis-
cretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its 
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.”34 
In other words, the intelligible principle limitation ensures that the 
federal agency does not have the same lawmaking authority as Congress.  
Rather, it can only make regulations within the parameters established by 
Congress.  In effect, the agency is carrying out or enforcing congressional 
intent by making regulations. 
During the New Deal Era, there was a triage of cases where the court 
found that Congress violated the intelligible principle standard when 
providing authority to agencies under some of the New Deal programs.35  
These cases became part of the impetus of the tension between the Court 
and President Roosevelt that resulted in Roosevelt’s infamous Court 
packing plan and the subsequent “switch in time to save nine.”36  
Since that time, the Supreme Court has continued to apply the intelli-
gible principle standard, but it has not invalidated any federal legislation 
under that standard and displays much greater deference to Congress’ 
power to delegate regulatory power to agencies than it did in the 1930’s.37 
  
 32. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1892); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 
394, 409 (1928). 
 33. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
 34. Field, 143 U.S. at 693-94. 
 35. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 
295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). 
 36. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, 
the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 239, 260-268 (2005); Shepherd, supra n. 
13, at 1563. 
 37. See e.g. Loving v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748, 769 (1996) (upholding delegation of authority to the 
President to promulgate rules for court-martials, specifying aggravating factors for capital sentencing); 
Touby v. U.S., 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (upholding delegation of authority to the Attorney General 
under the Controlled Substances Act); Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (upholding delega-
tion of authority to the United States Sentencing Commission); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn. 
Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  For a more complete discussion of the topic see Krotoszynski, supra n. 36, 
at 260-68. 
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D.  Appointment of Agency Officers 
Additional separation of powers issues sometimes arise from 
congressional efforts to control, or limit the ability of the Executive Branch 
to control, agencies.  One way Congress attempts to control agency actions 
is by influencing the appointment and removal of agency heads.  Article II 
of the United States Constitution provides the President with the authority 
to nominate and appoint, with the advice and consent of the senate, 
“Officers of the United States.”  It also provides that Congress can vest the 
appointment of “inferior officers as they think proper in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”38  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this language as creating two classes of 
officers: “principal officers,” who must be nominated by the President and 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and 
“inferior officers,” where Congress can choose from the three methods of 
appointment mentioned in the Constitution.39  
The heads, or multi-member groups, that govern federal departments 
and agencies are considered principal officers, meaning they must be 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.40  
Consequently, congressional efforts to enact statutes that would allow 
Congress to appoint members to govern independent regulatory agencies 
have been rejected by the Court.41  Congress can, however, impose some 
criteria or qualification requirements on the type of person the President 
can appoint as a commission member of an independent regulatory 
agency.42 
Other agency appointees can also be officers under the Constitution.  
An officer is “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the 
laws of the United States” or that performs “a significant governmental 
duty exercised pursuant to a public law.”43  The question of whether an 
  
 38. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
 39. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 
(1998). 
 40. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-26; Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 15.3. 
 41. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132-36. 
 42. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Act requires the President to nominate five 
commissioners to head the independent agency and the commissioners must consider individuals who, 
by reason of their background and expertise in areas related to consumer products and protection of the 
public from risks to safety, are qualified to serve as members of the Commission.  15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) 
(2006).  Not more than three of the Commissioners can be affiliated with the same political party.  Id. 
at § 2053(c). 
 43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-26, 141. 
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officer is a “principal” or an “inferior” officer is important because the 
distinction makes a difference in terms of the appointment process.44  
The court has declined to provide an exact distinction between 
“principal” and “inferior” officers.  In Morrison v. Olson, the court held 
that the independent legal counsel was an inferior officer because she was 
subject to removal by the Attorney General, had the authority to perform 
only certain limited duties, had limited jurisdiction, and was occupying a 
temporary position or appointment.45  These four factors (tenure, 
jurisdiction, removal, and duties) establish a standard for courts to consider 
when deciding whether an officer is “principal” or “inferior.”46  
E.  Removal of Agency Officers 
The flip side of the power to appoint agency officers is the power to 
remove them from office.  Congress itself may not remove officers except 
by impeachment.47  While the Constitution expressly addresses the 
President’s ability to nominate and appoint officers, it does not expressly 
address removal.  The Supreme Court has determined that the President 
has the implicit authority to remove officers from federal departments and 
agencies under the “executive power” and under the authority to “take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.”48   
In the context of principal officers in federal departments and in 
dependent agencies, the President’s power to remove seems virtually 
absolute.  These officers serve at the pleasure of the President and can be 
  
 44. Issues also arise when presidents attempt to fill vacant agency head positions with deputies or 
assistants from within the department that previously did not go through the appointment and confor-
mation process.  This issue arose in 2003 when President Bush had to fill a vacancy of director of the 
OMB.  The President wanted to have the position filled with an “acting director” for a period of time to 
allow time for selection and confirmation of a full time director.  Normally, the assistant or deputy 
director would fill that slot, but in this case that position was also vacant and the next level within 
OMB was the executive associate director who had not previously gone through the Senate confirma-
tion process.  The issue became whether the President could unilaterally appoint a person to a role of a 
principal officer (director of the department) without going through the confirmation process.  The 
Office of Legal Counsel to the President opined that the President could do so because even though the 
director of the OMB was a principal officer, an acting director would be an inferior officer that could 
be appointed by the President alone.  See United States Department of Justice, The United States Attor-
ney General’s Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President Regarding Designation 
of Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ 
opinions/06122003_ombdirector2.pdf (June 12, 2003). 
 45. 487 U.S. at 671-73. 
 46. Weiss v. U.S., 510 U.S. 163, 192 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (applying the Morrison factors 
to decide if military judges are principal officers); Tracey A. Hardin, Rethinking Independence: The 
Lack of an Effective Remedy for Improper For-Cause Removals, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 197, 215 (1997).  
 47. Bowsher v. Snyder, 478 U.S. 714, 714-15 (1986). 
 48. See Parsons v. U.S., 167 U.S. 324, 343 (1897).  For a more detailed discussion of the President’s 
removal authority see Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause and the Removal Power: 
Theory and Séance, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 841 (1993). 
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removed at any time, for any reason, or for none whatsoever.49  
Congressional efforts to impose limits on the President’s ability to remove 
these principal officers have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.50  
The President’s authority, however, to remove principal officers in 
independent regulatory agencies, and to remove inferior officers, is not 
absolute.  Congress can pass laws that limit the President’s ability to 
remove these officers.51  In Morrison, the court developed the “core 
function test” to assess the constitutionality of congressional efforts to limit 
the President’s removal powers.  The test is designed to ensure that 
congressional limitations on removal do not interfere with the President’s 
ability to exercise the “core functions” of executive power and faithfully 
execute laws as required under Article II of the Constitution.52  In 
Morrison, the court determined that a statute imposing a good cause 
limitation on the removal of independent counsel (an inferior officer at a 
dependent agency) passed the core function test and did not impermissibly 
burden the President’s ability to exercise core functions.53  
F.  Congressional Control of Agency Rulemaking 
There are a number of permissible ways for Congress to control 
agency rulemaking.  As noted above, each agency generally has an 
enabling statute that defines what that agency may do.  These statutes can 
also establish protocols or procedures that the agency must follow when 
making regulations.  Additionally, Congress has passed a number of 
general statutes like the APA,54 the Paperwork Reduction Act,55 and the 
Congressional Review Act56 that apply to numerous agencies.  These laws 
require all the agencies within the scope of their corresponding law to 
follow certain requirements when promulgating regulations.  
  
 49. See Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 116-28, 176-77 (1926) (The United States Supreme Court struck 
down a congressional statute which provided that first-class postmasters could not be removed from 
office by the President unless the Senate concurred.  The President’s power to remove such postmasters 
without senatorial approval was upheld.); see also Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 15.1. 
 50. Myers, 272 U.S. at 177. 
 51. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (upholding a statute that allowed for removal of independent counsel 
(an inferior officer) only for good cause); Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935) 
(upholding a statute that permitted removal of the Commissioner of the FTC for inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office).  
 52. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690-91. 
 53. See id. at 690-94. 
 54. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2006). 
 55. See generally 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (2006). 
 56. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. 
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One way that Congress cannot control agency rulemaking is through a 
“legislative veto” of specific agency actions or rules.  In INS v. Chadha, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that such vetoes were 
unconstitutional because they were issued only by the House of 
Representatives.57  The Supreme Court held that to allow one part of 
Congress to overturn an agency action violated the bi-cameralism 
requirement in the Constitution since it requires both the House and Senate 
to approve “legislative acts.”58  The Court held that the veto also violated 
the Presentment Clause of the Constitution which requires legislative acts 
to be presented to the President to be signed into law or vetoed.59  
Since Chadha, Congress has passed a number of laws in an effort to 
maintain similar oversight of specific agency actions.  For example, the 
Congressional Review Act requires agencies to submit rules or regulations 
to Congress and the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) to review “major 
rules” before they go into effect.  Congress has sixty days to review the 
rules and may disapprove of a rule through a joint resolution passed in both 
the House and Senate.  The joint resolution then goes to the President who 
may approve the joint resolution, with the effect of negating the agency’s 
rule, or veto the resolution, allowing the agency’s action to stand unless 
Congress can override the President’s veto through a supermajority vote.60 
G.  Federal Rulemaking Process – Informal Rulemaking Requirements 
One of the primary activities of federal agencies is to issue regulations 
(also called rules) that implement the statutes the agency is charged with 
enforcing.  The regulations themselves have the force of law and have been 
referred to as “little statutes.”61  Federal agencies issue more than 4,000 
regulatory actions each year.62  
The APA serves as a baseline of legal requirements that virtually all 
federal agencies must follow when promulgating regulations or rules.63  
  
 57. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
 58. Id. at 945-48. 
 59. See id. at 949-54.  Chadha involved an agency adjudicatory decision.  The United States Su-
preme Court applied Chadha to agency rulemaking in subsequent cases.  See Process Gas Consumers 
Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (summarily affirming a Court of Appeals 
decision striking a congressional veto of a Federal Trade Commission regulation). 
 60. See Fox, supra n. 22, at § 2.04 (providing further explanation of the law); see also Cong. Re-
search Serv., Disapproval of Regulations by Congress: Procedure Under the Congressional Review 
Act, October 10, 2001, http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31160.pdf (Oct. 10, 2001). 
 61. Reese & Seamon, supra n. 9, at 13. 
 62. U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency 
of Those Reviews, GAO-03-929 at 17 (September 2003). 
 63. The APA applies to federal agencies as defined in Section 551(1) of the law.  5 U.S.C. § 551(1). 
That definition includes the fifteen federal cabinet-level executive departments and the agencies within 
these departments.  It also includes independent agencies.  See Reese & Seamon, supra n. 9, at 10. 
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The APA has a number of requirements for administrative regulations and 
for the process of making regulations.  The APA defines a regulation or 
rule as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and fu-
ture effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”64  
Rulemaking is defined as the agency’s process for “formulating, amending 
or repealing a rule.”65  
There are generally three categories of rulemaking at the federal level: 
informal, formal and hybrid.  Informal rulemaking requirements are often 
referred to as “notice and comment” rulemaking because the main re-
quirements are that agencies provide notice of the proposed rule and give 
interested parties the chance to comment on the proposal.66  
With informal rulemaking, an agency generally drafts a proposed regu-
lation internally based on staff recommendations, or recommendations of 
committees or groups formed to research an issue within the jurisdiction of 
the agency.67  Individuals or groups outside the agency may also petition to 
engage in rulemaking.68  Sometimes the agency will submit an “Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” to the public through the Federal Register 
asking the public to provide information and comments that will help de-
velop a proposed regulation. 
In 1990, Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, giving 
agencies the option of involving outside stakeholders in the process of 
drafting a proposed rule.69  The process is voluntary and agencies have 
discretion on whether or not to utilize it. 70 
When an agency does use a negotiated rulemaking process, it uses a 
committee (called a negotiating committee) to develop the substance of the 
proposed rule.  The process starts with the agency giving notice in the Fed-
eral Register of the subject and scope of the rule to be developed, along 
with a list of interests likely to be significantly affected by the rule, and a 
  
 64. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Reese & Seamon, supra n. 9, at 183. 
 67. Under Exec. Or. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993), and the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602 (1996), most agencies must also develop a regulatory agenda that describes regula-
tory actions they are developing or have recently completed.  The agenda is published in the Federal 
Register twice a year, usually during April and October.  See GPO Access, The Unified Agenda, 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ua/index.html (accessed May 22, 2006). 
 68. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).  The agency is required to receive and consider rulemaking petitions by 
individuals or groups outside of the agency, but it can deny the petition and decline to enter rulemak-
ing.  The agency’s denial of a petition is subject to judicial review, but the court reviews a denial only 
to ensure that the agency adequately explained its reasons for declining to enter rulemaking.  See Ark. 
Power & Light Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commn., 725 F.2d 716, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1984); N. Spotted 
Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp 479, 482 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 561. 
 70. The law provides some criteria for agencies to consider when deciding whether negotiated 
rulemaking would be an appropriate process to use for a particular rule.  Id. at § 563. 
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list of outside persons proposed to represent said interests on the negotiat-
ing committee.71  The agency may use “conveners” to help them determine 
who should be on the committee.72  The notice must also inform the public 
that others may apply, or nominate still others, to be on the negotiating 
committee.73 
The agency is part of the negotiating committee, but does not run or 
facilitate the committee.  The committee is instead led by an impartial fa-
cilitator from outside the agency who tries to help members reach unani-
mous consensus on the substance of a proposed rule.74  If the committee 
does reach unanimous consensus, then the proposed rule goes through the 
remaining portions of the notice and comment requirements.75  
The rationale behind negotiated rulemaking is that the negotiation 
process will make the remaining parts of the notice and comment process 
run smoother, and there will be less objection to the proposed rule because 
the key stakeholders affected by the rule helped draft it.  The process is 
utilized successfully by a number of agencies,76 but it also has critics who 
suggest that federal agencies should not aim to please the groups they gov-
ern.  Rather, the agency should make its own independent determination of 
its activities based on statutory and regulatory obligations and the public 
interest.77  
After a proposed regulation is drafted by an agency, either under tradi-
tional methods or the negotiated rulemaking process, it generally goes to 
the OMB for review for compliance with Executive Orders, and laws like 
the Paperwork Reduction Act,78 the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act79 and 
  
 71. See Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 2.1.1(b). 
 72. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b). 
 73. Id. at § 564(a)-(b). 
 74. Id. at § 562(2)-(4). 
 75. See Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 2.1.1(b). 
 76. The EPA uses negotiated rulemaking in a variety of areas including regulations regarding 
Brownfields.  See e.g. Environmental Protection Agency, Convening Assessment Report on the Feasi-
bility of a Negotiated Rulemaking Process to Develop the All Appropriate Inquiry Standard Required 
Under the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, http://www.epa.gov/ 
brownfields/pdf/regfinal.pdf (Dec. 17, 2002); Environmental Protection Agency, Negotiated Rulemak-
ing Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/negregfs.htm (accessed May 22, 2006). 
 77. See William F. Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 Duke L.J. 1351, 1374-87 (1997). 
 78. See generally 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq.  Under this law, OMB reviews and approves (or disap-
proves) each collection of information by all Federal agencies (including all independent agencies).  
This includes information collections contained in agency regulations. 
 79. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1535 (2006).  Under this law, each agency must prepare a specific kind of 
benefit-cost analysis for any proposed and final rule “that may result in the expenditure by State, local, 
and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any one year.”  When preparing such an analysis, the agency must also “iden-
tify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those alternatives select the 
least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the 
rule.”  OMB reports annually to Congress on agency compliance with these requirements. 
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the Congressional Review Act.80  For example, regulations promulgated by 
dependent agencies, or independent executive agencies,81 that involve a 
“significant regulatory action,”82 must go to OMB to ensure compliance 
with Executive Order No. 12866.  The review includes a cost-benefit 
analysis of the regulation to ensure it entails the “least net cost to soci-
ety.”83  If the regulation is considered “economically significant,” meaning 
it is likely to result in an annual impact of $100 million or more, the 
agency must also prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) as part of 
the OMB review.  The RIA must assess the costs and benefits, as well as 
feasible alternatives, to the planned regulatory action.84  
OMB may suggest changes to the scope, impact, or costs and benefits 
of the rules, or it may return the rules for reconsideration by the agency.85  
In some cases, OMB requests that the agency withdraw the rule alto-
gether.86  Under Executive Order No. 12866, an agency can technically 
promulgate rules without OMB approval, but this rarely occurs.  Rather, 
the agency generally follows OMB’s recommendations or requests.87  
  
 80. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.  Under this law, the OIRA Administrator determines if an 
agency final rule is “major” (in general, having an annual economic effect of over $100 million), and 
thus subject to special provisions of that Act that allow Congress to consider the regulations on a fast 
track basis and may disapprove of a rule through a joint resolution that is passed in both the House and 
Senate and approved by the President.  
 81. Independent regulatory agencies do not have to submit regulations to OMB for compliance with 
executive orders. 
 82. Section 3(f) of Exec. Or. 12866 defines “significant” regulatory actions as:  
 
Any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may (1) have an annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a 
sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or 
safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) create a serious inconsis-
tency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) materi-
ally alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the 
rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) raise novel legal or policy issues arising 
out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive 
order. 
 
 83. See Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 15.1.3; see also Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, Memorandum 
For The President’s Management Council – Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_review-process.html#N_15_ (Sept. 20, 2001). 
 84. An economically significant rule is also a “major” rule under the Congressional Review Act 
which subjects the rule to a special fast track process described in supra n. 80.  5 U.S.C. § 804(2).  For 
a more detailed explanation see Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, Memorandum For The President’s Man-
agement Council – Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA, supra n. 83. 
 85. Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20 at § 15.1.3-1.4; Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, Memorandum For The 
President’s Management Council – Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA, supra n. 83. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20 at § 15.1.4; see also Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a 
system of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 
185-88 (1995); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash.  
L. Rev. 533, 546-49, 560-61 (1989). 
File: Johnson - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 437 Created on: 6/7/2006 11:16:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:25:00 PM 
2006 ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: A COMPARISON 449 
After OMB review, if an agency still intends to go forward with a 
regulation, the APA requires the agency to provide notice of its intent to 
promulgate the regulation.  This is done by placing the substance of the 
regulation, or a description of the subjects and issues involved in the regu-
lation, in the Federal Register88 along with: (1) a statement of the time, 
place and nature of public rulemaking proceedings; and (2) reference to the 
legal authority under which the rule is proposed.89  Under the APA, the 
agency must “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with 
or without the opportunity for oral presentation.”90 
The purpose of providing notice is to give interested parties an oppor-
tunity to effectively participate in the rulemaking process.  The notice must 
fairly apprise interested persons of the subjects and issues under considera-
tion by the agency.  Courts have interpreted the APA’s notice requirement 
to mean that the notice must let interested parties know that their interests 
are “at stake” or “on the table.”91 
To do this, the agency notice must inform interested parties of the legal 
basis for, and the data and methodology underlying, the proposed rule.92  
This allows interested parties to participate by making comments that re-
spond to the basis relied upon by the agency for proposing the rule.  
The agency then reviews the comments and determines if it will 
change its original proposed rule based on the comments, or leave the rule 
in its original form.  The agency must take into account, and publicly re-
spond to, comments that are “significant” or “of cogent materiality.”93  The 
agency must either change the rule to address these comments, or explain 
why it will not do so.94 
After the public notice and comment process is complete, some rules 
must be resubmitted to OMB for a final review.95 OMB may again recom-
mend changes to the rules.  In addition to OMB review, under the Con-
gressional Review Act, all agencies must submit most rules to both houses 
of Congress and to the Comptroller General of the GAO before the rule 
  
 88. The Federal Register is a legal newspaper published every business day by the National Ar-
chives and Records Administration (NARA).  It is the official daily publication for rules, proposed 
rules, and notices of federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other presiden-
tial documents.  See generally 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 90. Id. at § 553(c). 
 91. See Am. Med. Assn. v. U.S., 887 F.2d 760, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1989); Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, 
at § 2.1.2.  
 92. See Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 2.1.2. 
 93. Id. at § 2.1.4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. For example, regulations subject to Exec. Or. 12866 must be submitted again to OMB for a 
compliance review before the final rule is published.  Id. at § 15.1.3. 
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can go into effect.96 Agencies must also submit a report to help Congress 
evaluate the rule.  The report must include any cost-benefit analyses that 
have been performed and an assessment by the agency of compliance with 
applicable laws, such as the Unfunded Mandates Act and the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. 97 
If the rule is not considered a “major rule,”98 then it can go into effect 
after submission of the report itself.  If the rule is a “major rule,” the GAO 
performs an analysis to determine if the agency complied with the 
requirements of applicable Executive Orders, and with the various statutes 
that may apply such as the Unfunded Mandates Act,99  the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act,100 the Paperwork Reduction Act,101 and the APA.102  
Congress then has sixty days to review major rules and may disapprove of 
a rule through a joint resolution passed in both the House and Senate and 
presented to the President for approval or veto. 103  
After the Congressional Review Act process, the agency publishes the 
final version of the rule in the Federal Register with responses to the public 
comments and an explanation of any changes it made based on OMB re-
view.104  The rule also contains an effective date and sometimes an expira-
  
 96. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808.  There are some exceptions in the statute for certain regula-
tions that do not need to be submitted.  Agency statements that are policy statements, rules of practice, 
procedure or organization, or interpretive rules under the APA are also exempted.  See id. at §§ 804, 
807. 
 97. Id. at § 801(a)(1)(B).  The report must also contain a concise general statement of the rule, a 
statement of whether the rule is a “major rule” and the proposed effective date of the rule.  Id. at § 
801(a)(1)(A). 
 98. The definition of a major rule is essentially the same definition OMB uses to determine “signifi-
cant” regulations.  A rule is major if it has an annual effect of $100 million or more on the United 
States economy; or results in a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, 
federal, state, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or has significant adverse effects on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based 
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.  Id. at § 804(2). 
 99. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1535. 
 100. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-605, 607, 609. 
 101. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520. 
 102. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. 
 103. See Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 16.3; Fox, supra n. 22, at § 2.04 (providing further 
explanation of the law); Cong. Research Serv., Disapproval of Regulations by Congress: Procedure 
Under the Congressional Review Act, http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31160.pdf 
(Oct. 10, 2001). 
 104. See 5 U.S.C. § 552; Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 15.1.3-1.4; U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., 
OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews, GAO-03-
929 at 17 (Sept. 2003).  The description of notice and comment requirements in this part of the article is 
the general process that agencies follow.  In some situations, agencies can also promulgate interim rules 
that are issued without prior notice and are effective immediately.  The interim rule is designed to 
respond to an emergency situation and is usually followed by a final rule document which confirms that 
the interim rule is final, addresses comments received, and includes any further amendments.  There are 
also “direct final rules” which is where an agency adds, changes, or deletes regulatory text at a speci-
fied future time, with a duty to withdraw the rule if the agency receives adverse comments within the 
period specified by the agency.  See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 
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tion date.105  The rule subsequently becomes part of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (“CFR”).106  
Although the final version of the rule may be different from the origi-
nal proposed rule, it must be a “logical outgrowth” of the original rule.  
Whether a final rule is a “logical outgrowth” is a fact-intensive inquiry that 
courts have acknowledged is not always easy to answer.107  The standard 
relates back to the notice provisions of the APA that require agencies to let 
interested parties know that their interests are at stake, or that the agency is 
considering certain actions.108  Courts have found that a final rule is not a 
“logical outgrowth” when the agency provided no notice or indication in 
the original proposed rule of an issue addressed in a final rule, or when the 
final rule changes a pre-existing agency practice that was not addressed in 
the proposed rule.109 
The effect of the logical outgrowth test is that if an agency makes sig-
nificant changes to a rule based on public comments to the initial proposed 
rule, or based on OMB review, it may have to start over with a second 
stage of notice and comment if the initial notice did not provide sufficient 
information to let the public know that the changes in the final rule were 
“on the table.”110 
H. Formal and Hybrid Rulemaking Requirements 
The informal rulemaking process is governed by Section 553 of the 
APA and is the most common form of rulemaking.  If the agency’s ena-
bling statutes are silent on the rulemaking procedures the agency must fol-
low, then the agency follows the APA’s Section 553 requirements.111  
If an agency’s own statutes or regulations add additional rulemaking 
requirements, like allowing the public to make oral presentations to the 
agency about a rule, or requiring the agency to perform a cost benefit 
  
Admin. L. Rev. 703 (1999); Ronald M. Levin, More On Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not 
Corner-Cutting, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 757 (1999). 
 105. The publication of a final rule in the Federal Register must be made not less than thirty days 
before the effective date of a rule.  5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
 106. The CFR is a codification (arrangement of) the general and permanent rules published in the 
Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government.  It was created 
by the Federal Register Act in 1934 to provide for the custody of presidential proclamations, executive 
orders, and administrative rules, regulations, notices, and other documents of general applicability and 
legal effect and for the prompt and uniform printing and distribution of them.  The Federal Register Act 
at 44 U.S.C. § 1510 as implemented in 1 C.F.R. § 8.1 requires rules that have general applicability and 
legal effect to be published in the CFR. 
 107. Chocolate Mrfs. Assn. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (1985). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Am. Med. Assn., 887 F.2d at 767-68. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Reese & Seamon, supra n. 9, at 184-86.  
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analysis of proposed regulations, then the process is considered “hybrid” 
rulemaking.112  
Formal rulemaking requirements are in Sections 556 and 557 of the 
APA and they include the same notice requirements as informal rulemak-
ing, but add a requirement that the agency have a formal public hearing on 
the record regarding the proposed rule, as opposed to just giving the public 
a chance to submit written comments to the agency on the proposed rule.113  
Formal rulemaking is relatively rare and there is a general judicial pre-
sumption against applying it to agency rulemaking proceedings.114  The 
presumption is overcome only if Congress clearly intends that the agency 
follow formal rulemaking requirements by stating in the agency’s enabling 
statutes that the agency must follow Sections 556 and 557 of the APA, or 
stating in the enabling statutes that the agency’s rules must be “made on 
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”115 
Sections 556 and 557 of the APA also govern formal adjudicatory 
hearings, so formal rulemaking requires something similar to a formal ad-
judicatory proceeding (a trial-type proceeding).  A board or body of the 
agency, or an administrative law judge, considers evidence presented by 
parties on the record.  There are some differences between the formal adju-
dicatory hearing requirements and formal rulemaking requirements.  With 
rulemaking, the agency has the ability to limit evidence to written submis-
sions as long as it does not prejudice any of the parties.116  Parties are, 
however, still entitled to submit rebuttal evidence based on the written 
submissions and they can cross-examine other parties where necessary for 
“a full and true disclosure of the facts.”117  After all of the evidence is pre-
sented, the agency develops the rule based on the information in the formal 
record and it is then posted in the Federal Register and the CFR.118   
I. Exceptions to the APA’s Requirements 
There are some rules or regulations that are exempt from the APA’s 
notice and comment requirements.  These include exceptions for certain 
kinds of rules like rules concerning military or foreign affairs functions, 
  
 112. The common example of hybrid rulemaking is found in the Federal Trade Commission.  When 
promulgating trade regulations, Congress by statute requires the FTC to follow the notice and comment 
requirements of § 553 of the APA and to also have an informal hearing with oral or written submis-
sions by interested persons and cross-examination if material facts are in dispute. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a). 
 113. Koch, supra n. 7, at § 4.34. 
 114. Id.; Aman & Mayton, supra n. 20, at § 8.2.2. 
 115. U.S. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1973).  
 116. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). 
 117. Koch, supra n. 7, at § 4.34. 
 118. Id. at § 4.46. 
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rules concerning agency management or personnel, and rules concerning 
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or government contracts.119  It also 
includes more general exceptions for (1) rules of practice, procedure and 
organization, (2) interpretative rules, (3) general statements of policy, and 
(4) rules that fit under the “good cause exception” of the APA. 
1. Practice, Procedure and Organization 
Rules of practice, procedure and organization are considered proce-
dural rules, as opposed to substantive ones, and generally affect the 
agency’s internal organization, or the way the agency conducts proceed-
ings like administrative hearings.  Rules are generally considered proce-
dural as long as they do not substantially alter the rights or interests of par-
ties governed by the agency.  Courts have recognized that procedural rules 
can often have substantive impact on the rights and interests of those gov-
erned by the agency, so to determine if a rule fits into this exception, courts 
use a balancing test to decide if the interests promoted by requiring notice 
and comment are outweighed by the agency’s counter-veiling interests in 
effectiveness, efficiency, expedition and reduction in expense.120  
For example, in JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the FCC changed its 
procedures for reviewing applications for FM radio license applications.121  
The agency had previously given applicants a chance to correct errors or 
defects in their applications, but changed their rules to deny applications 
that contained errors or defects without giving the applicant a chance to fix 
the application.122  The court held that the rule did not need to go through 
the notice and comment process because the change was procedural and 
the interest in public participation in developing the rule was outweighed 
by the agency’s efficiency interests.123  
2. Interpretative Rules  
Under the APA, interpretative rules are “rules or statements issued by 
an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes 
and rules which it administers.”124  This is contrasted with substantive rules 
  
 119. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). 
 120. JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 121. Id. at 322.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 327. 
 124. FSU College of Law, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 39 
(1947), http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947iii.html (accessed May 22, 2006) [hereinafter A.G. 
Manual]. 
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which are “issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority . . . [and] 
have the force and effect of law.”125  
Interpretative rules are sometimes referred to as “non-legislative rules” 
since the agency is not using its legislative authority (the power to make 
rules) when enacting them.  Rather, the agency is using its executive au-
thority to interpret what various laws or rules mean.  When an agency has 
rulemaking authority, courts generally use a “legal effect test” to determine 
if an agency rule or statement fits into this interpretative rule exception.  
Under the legal effect test, courts look at a number of factors to try to de-
termine if the agency’s statement adds a new legal requirement or simply 
interprets current requirements in existing rules or statutes.  The factors 
include:  
(1) How the agency characterized or labeled its rule or statement 
including whether the agency purported to use its rulemaking au-
thority when issuing the rule or statement and whether the agency 
published it in the CFR;  
(2) Whether the rule or statement imposes a new standard of con-
duct or new obligations;  
(3) Whether the rule or statement has mandatory language; and  
(4) Whether the agency intends to be bound by the terms of the 
statement or rule, or if it leaves the agency free to exercise discre-
tion in the future.126 
For example, in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,127 a court 
considered whether Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) rules that set 
levels of allowable contaminates in certain foods were interpretive rules.  
The court looked to the factors in the legal effect test and found that the 
rules were not interpretative because it had mandatory language, the FDA 
intended the rules to have a legal or binding effect, and the FDA used the 
rules in enforcement proceedings to determine if the contaminates in cer-
tain foods violated the agency’s statutes.128  
By contrast, in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health 
Administration,129 the same court found that program policy letters issued 
by the Mine Safety and Health Administration that stated the agency’s 
position that certain x-ray readings qualify as a diagnosis of lung disease 
  
 125. Id. 
 126. Alaska v. Dept. of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 127. 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 128. Id. at 947-48. 
 129. 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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under the agency’s regulations were interpretative.  The court based its 
decision on the fact that the policy letters did not impose any new obliga-
tions on those governed by the agency, the agency did not purport to utilize 
its rulemaking authority when issuing the policy letters, and the agency did 
not include the letters in the CFR.130 
3. Policy Statements 
Another exemption from the APA’s notice and comment requirements 
are general statements of policy under Section 553(b) of the APA.  Policy 
statements are “issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of 
the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary 
power.”131  
Courts use the “binding effect test” to determine if an agency statement 
fits in this category.  Generally speaking, if an agency merely announces 
what the agency is going to do in the future, such as providing a method by 
which it will determine substantive questions in the future, and just pro-
vides guidance to agency officials in exercising their discretion, it is a 
statement of policy.  If the agency imposes a current duty or obligation and 
narrowly limits agency officials’ discretion in implementing the statement, 
it is not a policy statement because it has a present or binding effect.132  
Like the legal effect test, courts consider a number of factors including 
whether the agency’s statement was published in the CFR and the agency’s 
characterization of the statement, but the characterization is not determina-
tive.133  
For example, in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor,134 the Secretary of 
the Department of Labor issued a directive that changed the precertifica-
tion of certain occupations for visa issuance.  The agency claimed it was a 
statement of general policy, but the court rejected the argument because the 
directive changed existing rights and obligations by requiring pre-certified 
aliens to submit proof of specific job offers, as well as a statement of their 
qualifications, which they did not have to do previously.135  
  
 130. Id. at 1112-13. 
 131. A.G. Manual, supra n. 124, at 39. The United States Supreme Court adopted this definition in 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993).  In Vigil, the court held that an agency announcement about 
the way it planned to allocate unrestricted funds was a statement of policy and not subject to notice and 
comment.  Id. 
 132. Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 1987); Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 133. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1418-20 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
 134. 469 F.2d 478, 480 (2d Cir. 1972).  
 135. Id. at 481-82. 
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By contrast in American Hospital Association v. Bowen,136 a court con-
sidered whether a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) submitted by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services was a policy statement.  The court 
noted that the RFP was not binding on the agency and the terms of the con-
tract awarded to a successful applicant could vary from the terms in the 
RFP.137  As a result, the court found that the RFP was merely the agency’s 
tentative intentions for the future and that those intentions could be modi-
fied by the agency depending on the responses to the RFP.  Hence, the RFP 
did not have present effect and did not limit the agency’s discretion, so it 
was a policy statement.138 
4. The Good Cause Exception 
Agency rules or regulations may also be exempt from the APA’s no-
tice and comment requirements under the “good cause” exception in Sec-
tion 553(b).  The good cause exception permits agencies to bypass the no-
tice and comment requirements if they are “impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.”139  The purpose of the good cause excep-
tion is to allow agencies to avoid rulemaking procedures such as notice and 
comment when following the procedures would do real harm.140  Courts 
construe the exception narrowly.141  
The exception generally applies when (1) providing notice would de-
feat the objective of a rule, (2) immediate agency action is necessary to 
avoid a health hazard or imminent harm, or (3) agency inaction would lead 
to serious dislocation in governmental programs or in the marketplace.142  
Under the APA, if an agency intends to rely upon the good cause ex-
ception as a basis to avoid the notice and comment process, the agency 
must incorporate its findings of good cause and a brief statement of the 
reasons for the finding when it publishes the rule in the Federal Register.143  
This ensures that the agency does not act in silence and it gives courts a 
basis for reviewing the exception.144  
  
 136. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 137. Id. at 1053. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). 
 140. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 911 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 141. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  
 142. Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 184 (1st Cir. 1983); Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act’s “Good Cause” Exemption, 36 Admin. L. Rev. 113 (1976). 
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 144. U.S. v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 121 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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J. Judicial Review of Rules 
The standard of judicial review of agency rules promulgated through 
informal or hybrid rulemaking is generally the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.145 The standard is a fairly deferential one with the court generally 
looking to see if there is a rational connection between the information the 
agency received during the rulemaking process and the decision the agency 
ultimately made.146  In making this determination, courts give the rulemak-
ing record (the information the agency developed or relied upon in making 
the rule and the information submitted to the agency by public comment) a 
“hard look” to ensure that the agency’s decision is based on relevant facts 
and is not a clear error of judgment.147 
Courts have found agency rules arbitrary and capricious when the 
agency  
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, of-
fered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a differ-
ence in view or the product of agency expertise. 148 
For formal rulemaking, the standard of review is the “substantial evi-
dence” standard.  Under the substantial evidence standard, a court will 
uphold an agency rule promulgated through formal rulemaking as long as 
the rule is reasonable or the administrative record contains “such reason-
able evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”149  
If the rule involves the agency’s interpretation of a statute or of statu-
tory obligations or requirements, then courts apply a different standard 
(regardless of whether the rule was developed through informal, hybrid or 
formal rulemaking).  Under Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.,150 the court first looks to see if Congress has “directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”151  If Congress has, then “that is the end of 
  
 145. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 146. Motor Veh. Mfrs. Assn. v. St. Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 147. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 420 (1971); Harold Leven-
thal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1974). 
 148. Motor Veh. Mfrs. Assn., 463 U.S. at 43. 
 149. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Some have suggested that there really is 
not any functional difference between the arbitrary and capricious standard and the substantial evidence 
standard.  See Assn. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Bd., 745 
F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 150. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 151. Id. at 842.  
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the matter; for . . . the agency must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.”152  
In other words, if congressional intent on the statutory requirement at 
issue is clear, then the agency must abide by it and cannot issue a regula-
tion that is contrary to that intent.  If Congress did not address the question 
at issue, then the court looks to see if the agency’s interpretation is based 
on a “permissible” or “reasonable” construction of the statute.153  The 
court’s rationale behind the different standard for this situation is that Con-
gress delegated to the agency the role of implementing the statute and fill-
ing in the specific details left open by Congress in the statute, so a court 
should only overturn the agency’s interpretation if it is “manifestly con-
trary to the statute.”154 
III.  NEW HAMPSHIRE AGENCIES 
A. History and Development 
New Hampshire also has a long history of administrative agencies.  A 
number of state agencies had their beginnings in the mid-1800’s.  For ex-
ample, in 1865 New Hampshire established a Fish and Game Department, 
the first one of its kind in New England, to oversee and conserve New 
Hampshire’s fish and wildlife.155 Two years later in 1867, the State estab-
lished a Board of Education.156 
Like federal agencies, state agencies were provided with authority to 
perform a number of tasks, including developing administrative rules.  
Agency enabling statutes, however, were not consistent in requirements for 
developing rules.  As a result, each agency tended to develop its own proc-
ess and had its own idiosyncrasies in the way it developed rules.157  Addi-
tionally, there was some confusion on when agency statements were 
  
 152. Id. at 842-43. 
 153. Id. at 843-44. 
 154. Id. 
 155. N.H. St. Govt., New Hampshire Almanac: A Brief History of New Hampshire, 
http://www.state.nh.us/nhinfo/history.html (accessed May 22, 2006).  Historically, fishing played a big 
role in New Hampshire’s settlement and economic development and the Fish and Game Department 
became necessary to oversee this area. 
 156. R. Stuart Wallace & Douglas E. Hall, A New Hampshire Education Timeline 4, 
http://www.nhhistory.org/edu/support/nhlearnmore/nhedtimeline.pdf (Aug. 8, 2004) (accessed May 22, 
2006).  The state enacted a major education reform law in 1919 that gave the Board and the Department 
of Education much of its current structure and authority.  Id. at 5. 
 157. Patrick T. Hayes, The Development of Administrative Law in New Hampshire, 23 N.H.B.J. 133, 
133 (1982). 
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“rules” that were meant to be binding on the public and when they were 
just “recommendations” that the public “should” follow.158  
To resolve these issues, New Hampshire adopted its first administra-
tive procedure act in 1973.159  The law was based on a Model State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act developed in 1946 and revised in 1961 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.160  The law 
provided procedural requirements that agencies had to follow when devel-
oping or promulgating rules.161  The law also required that agency regula-
tions be accessible to the public and published in a uniform manner.162  
Initially, some agencies resisted the new law’s procedural require-
ments, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court made clear in a number of 
cases that the requirements had to be followed by the agency, if the agency 
wanted its administrative rules to be valid and binding.163  In 1981, the law 
was amended to require all state agencies to readopt all of their administra-
tive rules under the law’s requirements within two years.164  Rules that 
were not readopted under this process would sunset and no longer be valid 
at the two year deadline.165  
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
revised the Model State Administrative Procedure Act in 1981 and New 
Hampshire incorporated a number of those changes into its law in 1983 as 
part of an effort to restructure New Hampshire’s administrative agencies.166  
These changes gave the law many of its current requirements and codified 
the law as New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 541-A.  
B. Agency Creation and Structure 
The structure of New Hampshire’s administrative agencies is different 
than the federal structure in part because of differences in New Hamp-
shire’s form of government as compared to the federal system.  For exam-
ple, New Hampshire has a split executive with a Governor and an Execu-
  
 158. Stephen C. Shaw, Current Status of the Administrative Procedures Act, 23 N.H.B.J. 137, 138 
(1982). 
 159. Hayes, supra n. 157, at 133-34; Shaw, supra n. 158, at 137. 
 160. Koch, supra n. 7, at § 1.5; Hayes, supra n. 157, at 133-34. 
 161. Hayes, supra n. 157, at 134. 
 162. Shaw, supra n. 158, at 137. 
 163. See e.g. In re Denman, 419 A.2d 1084, 1088 (N.H. 1980) (holding an agency’s “oral regulation” 
invalid because the agency did not follow the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
developing the regulation and stressing that state agencies must comply with the law for the rules to 
have effect). 
 164. Shaw, supra n. 158, at 137. 
 165. Id. 
 166. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-G:2, 541-A (1983); Koch, supra n. 7, at § 1.5. 
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tive Council.  Both are elected by popular vote every two years.167  The 
five Executive Council members each represent a geographic portion of the 
state.168  The Governor and the Executive Council share executive author-
ity under the New Hampshire Constitution.169  With respect to administra-
tive agencies, the most relevant shared authority is the appointment and 
removal of department or agency heads and the shared control over de-
partment and agency budgets and expenditures.170  The Governor alone 
possesses the ability to issue executive orders to New Hampshire depart-
ments and agencies, much like the President at the federal level.171 
In 1983, the New Hampshire legislature restructured executive branch 
agencies to try to reduce and streamline them.  The legislature noted at that 
time that state agencies had grown in number from 32 in 1900 to more than 
140 in 1983.172  Today there are over one hundred rulemaking agencies in 
New Hampshire.173 
The reorganization created “departments” as the principal administra-
tive units of the executive branch.174  Departments have internal divisions, 
bureaus and sections that manage particular areas under the department’s 
jurisdiction.  Departments are often referred to as state agencies and they 
are defined as agencies under state law.175  While called departments, they 
are not quite the same as the cabinet-level departments in the federal sys-
tem.  They are more analogous to a mix of independent and dependent 
agencies.  
State departments are usually headed by a “Commissioner” that is 
nominated by the Governor and jointly appointed by the Governor and 
Executive Council by majority vote.176  Unlike the federal system and its 
advice and consent of the Senate requirement, the legislative branch does 
not play any official role in the appointment of specific agency heads under 
New Hampshire law.  Commissioners are the chief administrative officers 
  
 167. N.H. Const. pt. II, arts. 42, 60. 
 168. Id. at art. 65; Lorenca Consuelo Rosal, Eternal Vigilance: The Story of the New Hampshire 
Constitution 210-211 (N.H. Const. Educ. Corp. 1986). 
 169. N.H. Const. pt. II, arts. 46, 47; Rosal, supra n. 168, at 210.  
 170. N.H. Const. pt. II, arts. 46, 47; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:8(I), 16, 21-G:8 (2006); Rosal, supra 
n. 168, at 210. 
 171. The Governor issues executive orders under the authority granted in Part II Article 41 of the 
New Hampshire Constitution.  
 172. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-G:2(II) (1983). 
 173. Scott F. Eaton, Legislative Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking in New Hampshire, 1 RISK 
131, 131 (1990). 
 174. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-G:5(VI) (2006). 
 175. Id. at § 21-G:5(III). 
 176. Id. at § 21-G:8(I).   
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of departments and have a number of powers and duties defined by state 
statute.177 Commissioners report directly to the Governor.178 
Commissioners are generally appointed for four years, which is two 
years longer than the terms of New Hampshire’s Governor and Executive 
Councilors.179  Unlike the federal system, Commissioners of New Hamp-
shire departments do not serve at the pleasure of the Governor or the Ex-
ecutive Council and generally can only be removed for cause as defined by 
state statutes.180  As a result of these two factors, Commissioners often 
serve under Governors and Executive Council members that did not ap-
point them and incoming Governors must often work with Commissioners 
that they did not appoint.  
New Hampshire also has some “administratively attached agencies” 
which are defined as independent agencies that are linked to a department 
for administrative purposes.181  These agencies are often boards that over-
see a specific area like the Board of Podiatry, the Board of Nursing and the 
Juvenile Parole Board, all of which are all administratively attached to the 
Department of Health and Human Services.182   Administratively attached 
agencies are independent in the sense that they generally exercise their 
powers, duties and functions without the approval or control of the depart-
ment.  They generally have multi-member boards or commissions that are 
in charge of the agency, much like an independent agency at the federal 
level.  The board members are generally appointed by the Governor and 
Executive Council for a set period of time and, like Commissioners, they 
can only be removed for cause as defined by relevant state statutes.183 
Unlike independent regulatory agencies at the federal level, these at-
tached agencies are still part of the executive branch and subject to the 
same control and oversight mechanisms of the Governor and Executive 
Council.184 
  
 177. Id. at § 21-G:9. 
 178. Id. at § 21-G:9(I). There are some exceptions to this general structure. For example, the agency 
head of the Fish and Game Department is referred to as an executive director and the department has 
eleven Commissioners that serve in a policy making capacity similar to a board of directors for a corpo-
ration.  Id. at § 206:2(I), 4-a, 8(I). The Commissioners are appointed by the Governor and Executive 
Council and then they nominate the executive director to be appointed by Governor and Executive 
Council.  Id. at § 206:2(I), 8(I). The New Hampshire Department of Education has a similar structure 
except that the department head is called a Commissioner and its governing board is called the Board of 
Education.  Id. at § 21-N:3(I), 10(I). 
 179. N.H.Const. pt. II, arts. 42, 60; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-G:8(III). 
 180. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:1 (2006).  The agency’s enabling statute also may contain language 
regarding the appointment and removal of the Commissioner.   
 181. Id. at § 21-G:5(I), 10(I). 
 182. Id. at §§ 170-H:13(I), 315:1-a, 326-B:3(XII). 
 183. Id.; see also id. at §§ 4:1, 21-G:10. 
 184. For example, administratively attached agencies submit their budget requests through the de-
partment they are attached to and the requests are treated the same as other agency budget requests. The 
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C. Separation of Powers – Delegation of Legislative Authority  
New Hampshire has an express state constitutional provision regarding 
separation of powers that states:  
[T]he legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as sepa-
rate from, and independent of, each other, as the nature of a free 
government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of con-
nection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indis-
soluble bond of union and amity.185 
The separation of powers doctrine “does not require the erection of 
impenetrable barriers between the branches of our government.”186  The 
doctrine “contemplates some overlapping and duality in the division as a 
matter of practical and essential expediency.”187  However, when the ac-
tions of one branch of government “defeat or materially impair the inherent 
functions of another branch, such actions are not constitutionally accept-
able.”188  The growth of administrative agencies has long been accepted as 
consistent with the separation of powers provisions.189 
Much like the federal system, the New Hampshire legislature may 
delegate aspects of legislative authority to administrative agencies within 
certain boundaries.  For example, the legislature may provide administra-
tive agencies with the authority to develop rules to “fill in the details” and 
“effectuate the legislative purpose” of statutes and to enforce statutes.190  
Much like the federal system, the New Hampshire legislature may not 
provide an administrative agency with unbridled discretion to perform 
these tasks.191  Rather, in order to constitutionally provide rulemaking 
power to an agency, the legislature must declare a general policy and pre-
scribe standards for the agency to follow.192  This New Hampshire standard 
is very similar to the “intelligible principle standard” that is utilized at the 
federal level.193  
  
Governor can also require the agency to provide information through the department.  Id. at § 21-
G:10(I); see also N.H. St. Govt., New Hampshire Almanac: An Overview of NH State Government, 
http://www.state.nh.us/nhinfo/stgovt.html (accessed May 22, 2006). 
 185. N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 37. 
 186. In re Mone, 719 A.2d 626, 631 (N.H. 1998). 
 187. McKay v. N.H. Compen. App. Bd., 732 A.2d 1025, 1029 (N.H. 1999). 
 188. In re N.H. Bar Assn., 855 A.2d 450, 453-54 (N.H. 2004). 
 189. In re Boston & Maine Corp., 251 A.2d 332, 335 (N.H. 1969). 
 190. Guillou v. N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 503 A.2d 838, 840 (N.H. 1986); Ferretti v. Jackson, 188 
A. 474, 476 (N.H. 1936).  
 191. Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 734, 741 (N.H. 1986). 
 192. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 786 (N.H. 1981); Ferretti, 188 A. at 303. 
 193. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized the similarities between this approach and 
the intelligible principle standard.  Smith Ins., Inc. v. Grievance Comm., 424 A.2d 816, 819 (N.H. 
1980).  
File: Johnson - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 437 Created on: 6/7/2006 11:16:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:25:00 PM 
2006 ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: A COMPARISON 463 
For example, in Guillou v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles, 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that a state statute that 
authorized the Director of Motor Vehicles to suspend or revoke a driver’s 
license “for any cause which he may deem sufficient” was an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority because it “fail[ed] to declare a 
general policy and prescribe standards for administrative action.”194  The 
court said the statutory language provided “no guidance, standards, or con-
ditions” for the agency to follow when deciding whether to suspend or 
revoke a license.  As a result, the court determined that the delegation of 
authority violated the separation of powers provisions of the New Hamp-
shire Constitution.195 
Similarly, in Ferretti v. Jackson, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
held that a statute called the Milk Control Act violated separation of pow-
ers because it did not contain sufficient parameters on the authority dele-
gated to an agency.196  The Act created a Milk Control Board and gave the 
board the “power to supervise, regulate and control the distribution and 
sale of milk for consumption and/or use within the state” and the power to 
“adopt, promulgate and enforce all rules and regulations necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this act.”197 
The court held that such a “sweeping and general delegation of power 
clearly exceed[ed] constitutional limits” because agency authority could 
not be provided in such a “skeletonized . . . manner.”198  The court said that 
to be constitutional, the extent and limits of agency control must be deter-
mined by the legislature and failing to do so results in agencies that are  
“unconfined and vagrant” and is a “delegation running riot.”199  
D. Appointment of Agency Officers  
Unlike the United States Constitution, the New Hampshire 
Constitution does not address the appointment or removal of most agency 
or department officials.  The New Hampshire Constitution does address the 
appointment of judicial officers, military officers and the Attorney 
General.200  It requires them to be nominated and appointed by the 
Governor and Executive Council.  The New Hampshire Constitution also 
  
 194. 503 A.2d at 839-40.   
 195. Id. at 840. 
 196. 188 A. at 478.  
 197. Id. at 475. 
 198. Id. at 479. 
 199. Id. at 480 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 551-53 (one of the federal cases 
finding a New Deal statute unconstitutional under the intelligible principle standard)). 
 200. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 46; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21:M-3(I). 
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provides that the Secretary of State and the State Treasurer be chosen by 
joint ballot of the Senate and the House.201  
The process of appointing and removing other agency heads is based 
on state statutes.  As a result, the state legislature has more ability to 
control this aspect of administrative agencies than its federal counterpart 
because it can develop the standards and the process for appointment and 
removal without much constitutional interference.202  
The primary statute for the appointment of agency heads is New 
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 21-G:8 which requires 
appointment by the Governor and Executive Council for all department 
heads (“Commissioners”).  In the appointment process, the Executive 
Council serves a role that is similar to the United States Senate’s role in the 
federal process in that the appointment is with the advice and consent of 
the Council.203  The Governor generally has the sole authority to nominate 
Commissioners,204 but needs a majority vote of approval from the 
Executive Council for the appointment of the Commissioner, much like the 
President needs a majority vote of approval from the Senate.205   
This mix of power between the Governor and Executive Council has 
created a number of stand-offs over the years in the nomination and 
appointment process.206  In practice, it generally results in the Governor 
  
 201. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 67. 
 202. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 5; Brouillard v. Gov. & Council, 323 A.2d 901, 905 (N.H. 1974). 
 203. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21:31-a; Brouillard, 323 A.2d at 904. 
 204. The appointment of the departmental division directors within state departments is similar, but 
the Commissioner of the department has the nominating authority and then the Commissioner’s 
nominee goes to the Governor and Executive Council for appointment.  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-
G:8(II). 
 205. Sometimes the enabling statute of a specific agency or department creates a different process for 
the nomination and appointment of department or agency heads.  For example, at one time state statutes 
created an Advisory Commission of the Department of Health and Welfare to develop a list of 
nominees from which the Governor and Executive Council could appoint a Commissioner for the 
Department of Health and Welfare.  Brouillard, 323 A.2d at 902.  When the Governor and Executive 
Council refused to appoint any of the people on the list, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the 
legislature’s authority to create this nomination process and ruled that the Governor and Executive 
Council must appoint someone from the list of nominees.  Opinion of the Justices, 316 A.2d 174, 176 
(N.H. 1974).  
  Administratively attached agencies also sometimes follow a different approach as they are 
normally governed by multi-member groups (usually called boards or commissions) that are nominated 
by the Governor and appointed by the Governor and Executive Council.  These agencies may also have 
a director or administrator that is appointed by the multi-member group or by some combination of that 
group and the Commissioner of the Department that the agency is attached to.  See e.g. N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 318:2, 2-a, 309-A to 332-E; In re Westwick, 546 A.2d 1051, 1052 (N.H. 1988). 
 206. Perhaps the most famous stand-off is the one between the Governor and Executive Council 
regarding the appointment of the Commissioner of Health and Welfare.  As noted supra n. 205, the 
legislature created a statutory advisory committee to develop potential nominees for the position.  The 
Governor did not approve of any of the people on the list, but decided to present two of them to the 
Executive Council to vote on.  The Executive Council voted to approve both in separate votes.  After 
each vote, the Governor “negated” the appointment. The ordeal created three New Hampshire Supreme 
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“floating” a potential nominee’s name by the Executive Councilors and 
checking informally about a person’s chances of receiving approval before 
formally nominating the person for consideration by the Council.207 
E. Removal 
The process of removing department or agency officials is also largely 
governed by state statutes.  Unlike the federal system, New Hampshire law 
does not use a principal and inferior officer distinction or a core function 
test.  Instead, the requirements for removing agency officials that are 
appointed under state statutes is left to the legislature to determine by 
statute.  
The general New Hampshire statute on removal is New Hampshire 
Revised Statutes Annotated § 4:1.  Under this statute, department or 
agency officers that are appointed by the Governor and Executive Council 
can only be discharged or removed “for cause” which is defined as 
“malfeasance, misfeasance, inefficiency in office, incapacity or unfitness to 
perform assigned duties, or for the good of the department, agency, or 
institution to which such official is assigned.”208  Unless a department or 
agency’s enabling statute specifically says otherwise, only the Governor 
and Executive Council can remove an agency or department head and they 
can only do so by following the requirements of New Hampshire Revised 
Statutes Annotated § 4:1.209   
The “for cause” language in the statute is fairly broad and there are few 
cases defining the parameters or requirements of the statutory language.210  
There have been relatively few efforts to remove agency officials.211  
  
Court opinions and the final one said that the Governor did not have the authority to negate statutory 
appointments once they were presented and approved by the Executive Council.  Brouillard, 323 A.2d 
at 904-05.  However, because the Governor did not intend for either of the two people he submitted to 
the Council to be appointed, the court held that it would not allow the appointment of either of these 
two people to occur “by accident” and essentially upheld the Governor’s negation of the appointments 
in this one case only.  Id.; see also Opinion of the Justices, 316 A.2d 174; Opinion of the Justices, 312 
A.2d 702 (N.H. 1973). 
 207. The media also plays a big role in this process. Often a potential nominee is made known to the 
media by the Governor’s office in some informal fashion and then as part of the story the media writes 
on the potential nominee, the media contacts the Executive Councilors for their view on whether they 
would vote to approve that person or not.  Potential nominees that don’t receive public support from a 
majority of Councilors are generally not presented for formal consideration. 
 208. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:1.  The statute provides protection to all state officials who are not 
“classified employees.”  Non-classified employees include all agency officials that are elected by 
popular vote or by the legislature; the chief executive officer of each department and institution and 
independent agency; the deputy of any department head provided for by special statute; officers whose 
salary is specified or provided by special statute.  Id. at § 21-I:49. 
 209. Corson v. Thomson, 358 A.2d 866, 869 (N.H. 1976). 
 210. Bennett v. Thomson, 363 A.2d 187, 191 (N.H. 1976) (upholding the removal of the Director of 
Division of Economic Development when the Director made public remarks in his official capacity that 
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Under New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 4:1, the Attorney 
General, the Governor, any member of the Executive Council, or the 
appointing authority of such official,212 may petition the Governor and 
Council for the removal of an agency official by setting forth the grounds 
and reasons for removal.  If the Governor and three or more members of 
the Executive Council vote to accept the petition, then they schedule a 
hearing.213 The exact contours or requirements of the hearing process are 
not defined by the statute and seem to develop on an ad hoc basis.  The 
New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized that an agency official 
subject to a removal hearing is protecting a valid property interest, so 
constitutional procedural due process requirements apply.214  
At the conclusion of the hearing, a vote of three or more Council 
members, in concurrence with the Governor, is required to remove the 
state official from office.  The Governor and Council must provide written 
findings, including a time frame for removal, in support of a decision to 
remove an official from office.  Failure to obtain the required vote and 
concurrence of the Governor results in the dismissal of the petition.215  The 
Governor and Executive Councilors’ decision is appealable to the New 
Hampshire Superior Court.  An agency official who successfully defeats a 
petition for removal is also entitled to have the state pay for his or her 
attorney’s fees.216  
F. Legislative Control of Agency Rulemaking 
Legislative control of administrative agency rulemaking in New 
Hampshire has some similarities and some differences as compared to the 
federal system.  Like federal law, New Hampshire agencies are created by 
statutes that provide the agencies with authority and provide limits on that 
authority.  New Hampshire also has a state administrative procedure act 
  
were knowingly insubordinate and seriously compromised his ability to effectively carry out the 
responsibilities of the department). 
 211. A few notable efforts to remove that made court cases include the removal of the Director of 
Division of Economic Development for making an insubordinate speech.  Id.  Another included the 
New Hampshire Probation Department’s effort to remove the Director of Probation.  The Governor 
recused himself from presiding over the proceeding and the Senate President took his place in the 
proceedings.  After fifty days of hearings over the course of nearly a year, the Senate President and 
Executive Council denied the removal petition.  King v. Thomson, 400 A.2d 1169, 1170 (N.H. 1979).  
 212. As noted supra n. 205, sometimes an agency may have a different appointment process. 
 213. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:1. 
 214. King, 400 A.2d at 1171. 
 215. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:1(III). 
 216. Id. at § 4.1(IV)-(VI); King, 400 A.2d. at 1171. 
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that provides a baseline that state agencies must follow when making 
regulations and adjudicating claims.217  
Much like the United States Supreme Court, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court has declared legislative veto efforts unconstitutional.  In an 
Opinion of the Justices case, the court considered the constitutionality of a 
proposed law that established standing committees in the House and Senate 
to review and possibly reject rules proposed by State agencies.218  The 
court noted that since the rulemaking authority of administrative agencies 
derived solely from the power that the legislature delegated to them, the 
legislature could properly condition the exercise of that delegated authority 
upon its approval.219  Thus, the court said that the creation of a legislative 
veto was not “per se unconstitutional.”220   
The court, however, went on to state that allowing standing commit-
tees to decide if a rule should be approved or not was unconstitutional.  
The court reasoned it did not represent “legislative will” and violated pro-
visions of the New Hampshire Constitution that required the “legislative 
authority” of the government to be exercised only by a quorum of both the 
House and Senate.221  
The court also noted that the proposed legislative veto was unconstitu-
tional because it did not include a role for the Governor in the process.  
The court noted that the effect of this was to allow the legislature to make a 
law without giving the Governor the constitutionally required opportunity 
to approve or veto the law.222  The court’s rationale was identical to the 
rationale used by the United States Supreme Court two years later in 
Chadha when it rejected the legislative veto at the federal level.223  
New Hampshire subsequently developed a new scheme of legislative 
oversight that addressed the constitutional deficiencies the court noted in 
its Opinion of the Justices case.  The oversight has some aspects of a legis-
lative veto, but it does not include the final veto power itself.  The process 
involves a Joint Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules 
(“JLCAR”).  The Committee is composed of five state senators and five 
state representatives.  The Committee is appointed every two years by the 
Senate President and House Speaker, respectively, with no more than three 
senators and three representatives from each party.  The Committee meets 
year round at least once a month.224  
  
 217. See generally N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A; supra pt. II(A). 
 218. 433 A.2d 783. 
 219. Id. at 787. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 788. 
 222. Id. at 788-89. 
 223. Supra pt. I(F) (discussing Chadha). 
 224. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:2(II). 
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In its monthly meetings, JLCAR reviews agency rules and may ap-
prove a rule or object to it.225  The details of the process are explained in 
Part III(G) of this article.  An objection is not the same as the legislative 
veto because the agency’s rule still goes into effect even if the agency does 
not change the rule to address JLCAR’s objection.  The objection does 
have an effect on judicial review of the rule.  
JLCAR also has the statutory authority to issue a “joint resolution.”  
The joint resolution must be approved by a majority vote of both the House 
and Senate and presumably presented to the Governor for approval or 
veto.226  The joint resolution is similar to the resolution process available to 
Congress at the federal level under the Congressional Review Act.227 A 
JLCAR vote to sponsor a “joint resolution” prevents the agency from 
adopting and filing the rule until final legislative action is taken on the 
resolution or the passage of ninety consecutive calendar days during which 
the general court shall have been in session, whichever occurs first.228  If 
the resolution is passed into law, it invalidates the agency’s proposed rule.  
G. New Hampshire Rulemaking Process – Regular Rules  
Like federal rules, state rules or regulations promulgated by New 
Hampshire “administrative agencies pursuant to a valid delegation of au-
thority have the force and effect of laws.”229  The rulemaking authority 
which may be delegated by the legislature is limited.  The administrative 
agency’s authority allows it to “fill in details to effectuate the purpose of 
the statute.”230  Administrative rules which go beyond filling in details are 
invalid.231  “Rules adopted by State boards and agencies may not add to, 
detract from, or in any way modify statutory law.”232   
There are certain things that New Hampshire agencies cannot do 
through the rulemaking process unless they have express authority to do 
so.  For example, New Hampshire agencies cannot provide for penalties or 
fines, or require licenses or fees unless a state statute provides the agency 
with specific authority to do so.233 
  
 225. Id. at § 541-A:13. 
 226. Id. at § 541-A:13 (VII)(f).  
 227. Supra pts. I(F) and I(G) (discussing the Congressional Review Act). 
 228. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:13(VII)(c). 
 229. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 787. 
 230. Kimball v. N.H. Bd. of Accountancy, 391 A.2d 888, 889 (N.H. 1978); Reno v. Hopkinton, 349 
A.2d 585, 585 (N.H. 1975). 
 231. Kimball, 391 A.2d at 889; Reno, 349 A.2d at 586. 
 232. Kimball, 391 A.2d at 889. 
 233. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:22(III). 
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Then there are some situations where agencies must make rules in or-
der to fill in the details left open by a statutory requirement before the 
agency can take other actions like adjudicating claims.234  The reason for 
requiring a rule in this situation is to “give persons fair warning as to what 
standards the agency will rely on when making a decision [and to] elimi-
nate any need to develop standards on a case by case basis, which is time-
consuming; may lead to inconsistent results; and severely inhibits judicial 
review.”235  As long as an individual is not prejudiced by the agency’s fail-
ure to adopt rules, however, the agency’s actions will not be overturned.236  
New Hampshire’s Administrative Procedure Act (“New Hampshire’s 
APA” or “state APA”) governs the rulemaking process for most New 
Hampshire agencies.237  There are a number of New Hampshire statutes 
that grant rulemaking authority to agencies in some specific area that are 
exempt from the state APA’s requirements.238  Since New Hampshire’s 
APA is based on the model state APA legislation, it is similar to many 
other states’ administrative procedure acts.239  
New Hampshire does not have the same informal, formal and hybrid 
categories as the federal system.  Rather, the process for promulgating 
New Hampshire rules under the state APA depends on the kind of rule the 
agency is attempting to enact.  Under New Hampshire law, there are three 
categories of rules: regular rules, interim rules and emergency rules. 
Regular rules are analogous to the rules passed by federal agencies.240  
They are defined as: 
[E]ach regulation, standard, or other statement of general applica-
bility adopted by an agency to (a) implement, interpret, or make 
specific a statute enforced or administered by such agency or (b) 
prescribe or interpret an agency policy, procedure or practice re-
quirement binding on persons outside the agency, whether mem-
bers of the general public or personnel in other agencies.241 
  
 234. Nevins v. N.H. Dept. of Resources and Econ. Dev., 792 A.2d 388, 391-92 (2002). There is some 
case law to this effect at the federal level. Federal agencies, however, generally have broad discretion in 
deciding whether to proceed with rules or adjudicatory hearings to address issues. See e.g. SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
 235. Nevins, 792 A.2d at 391-92. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See generally N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A. 
 238. Id. at § 541-A:21. 
 239. Koch, supra n.7, at §§ 1.5, 2.31; supra pt. II(A). 
 240. Some federal agencies do have the authority to promulgate interim rules. For example, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission is allowed to make interim consumer product safety standards 
in some circumstances. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2082; Asimow, supra n. 104. 
 241. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:1(XV). 
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Like federal law, there are some agency statements that are not rules 
and do not have to go through the rulemaking process.  These include:  
(a) internal memoranda which set policy applicable only to its own 
employees and which do not affect private rights or change the 
substance of rules binding upon the public, (b) informational pam-
phlets, letters, or other explanatory material which refer to a statute 
or rule without affecting its substance or interpretation, (c) person-
nel records relating to the hiring, dismissal, promotion, or compen-
sation of any public employee, or the disciplining of such em-
ployee, or the investigating of any charges against such employee, 
(d) declaratory rulings, or (e) forms.242  
These “non-rules,” or exceptions from the rulemaking process, are dif-
ferent than the ones used in the federal system.  New Hampshire, for ex-
ample, does not exempt rules of practice, procedure and organization from 
public notice and comment requirements.243 There is also not a specific 
exception for “policy statements” or “interpretative rules” in New Hamp-
shire’s APA like in the federal APA.244  Agency statements, policies and 
interpretations that do not fit within the definition of a “rule,” however, 
would not need to go through rulemaking requirements.  
Like the federal system, New Hampshire rules generally start at the 
agency level with the agency deciding to enter into the rulemaking process 
for various reasons.  Like the federal APA, New Hampshire’s APA has a 
“rulemaking petition” provision that allows any interested person to peti-
tion an agency to adopt, amend or repeal a rule.245  Unlike the federal APA, 
the state APA has a specific deadline that requires the state agencies to 
determine whether to grant or deny the petition within thirty days.246 
Regular rules are generally developed internally by the agency staff.  
Some agencies and departments have governing boards that assist in the 
development of the rule and possess the official rulemaking authority for 
the agency.247  Unlike the federal system, New Hampshire does not have a 
formal negotiated rulemaking process to try to develop a consensus on the 
language of a proposed rule, but many state agencies informally convene 
groups of stakeholders to help develop proposed rules.  
  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at § 541-A:16. 
 244. See Petition of Pelletier, 484 A.2d 1119, 1123 (N.H. 1984); Michael Asimow, Guidance Docu-
ments in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 631, 638 (2002). 
 245. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:4. 
 246. Id. at § 541-A:4(I). 
 247. Id. at § 541-A:12, N:9. 
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New Hampshire agencies may also solicit public comment in written 
form or in public hearings on subjects the agency is considering for rule-
making.  The agency solicitation occurs by “Request for Advance Public 
Comment on Subject Matter of Possible Rulemaking” in the New Hamp-
shire Rulemaking Register.248  This is akin to the federal system’s “Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.”  
In drafting the rule, the agency must follow the New Hampshire Draft-
ing and Procedural Manual for Administrative Rules.  It details the proce-
dural requirements in the rulemaking process and explains the style, format 
and organizational requirements that New Hampshire administrative rules 
must meet.249  For example, it states that rules must be “drafted in plain 
English . . . [and] in a ‘clear and coherent manner.’”250   
Once a proposed rule is drafted, the agency must obtain a “Fiscal Im-
pact Statement” from the Office of Legislative Budget Assistant 
(“LBA”).251  The LBA is an entity within the legislative branch that con-
ducts investigations, analysis and research into the financial activities of 
New Hampshire governmental entities.  It also assists in the budget proc-
ess.252 It has some similarities to the GAO at the federal level.  
The fiscal impact statement is something of a blend of the federal cost-
benefit requirements in Executive Order 12866, and some of the require-
ments of federal statutes like: (1) the Paperwork Reduction Act;253 (2) the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act;254 and (3) the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act.255 
The LBA obtains information from the agency about the proposed rule 
and develops a statement that assesses the costs and the benefits of the rule.  
The analysis determines the cost to the citizens of the state and to the po-
litical subdivisions of the state, the cost to state funds, and an explanation 
  
 248. Id. at § 541-A:11(VIII). 
 249. The manual has a detailed overview of the rulemaking process including a helpful flow chart.  
New Hampshire Drafting and Procedural Manual for Administrative Rules ch. 3, § 2.1 (2001) [herein-
after New Hampshire Manual] (available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/Rules/manualtc.html). 
 250. Id.; see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:7. 
 251. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:5.  
 252. Id. at § 14:31. 
 253. See generally 44 U.S.C. § 3501. Under this law, OMB reviews and approves (or disapproves) 
each collection of information by all federal agencies (including all independent agencies).  This in-
cludes information collections contained in agency regulations. 
 254. See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1535.  Under this law, each agency must prepare a specific kind 
of benefit-cost analysis for any proposed and final rule that may result in the expenditure by state, local, 
and tribal governments of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.  
When preparing such an analysis, the agency must also identify and consider a “reasonable number of 
regulatory alternatives and from those alternatives select the least costly, most cost-effective or least 
burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule.”  Id. at § 1535(a). OMB reports annu-
ally to Congress on agency compliance with these requirements. 
 255. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612. 
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of any relevant federal mandates.256  The LBA also prepares an analysis of 
the impact of the rule on “independently owned businesses,” including a 
description of the reporting and recordkeeping requirements on small busi-
nesses.257  
Once the fiscal impact statement is prepared, the agency submits a 
Rulemaking Notice to the Division of Administrative Rules in the Office 
of Legislative Services (“Division”) for publication in New Hampshire’s 
Rulemaking Register.258  Rules that do not comply with the New Hamp-
shire New Hampshire Drafting and Procedural Manual for Administrative 
Rules are rejected by the Division and returned to the agency to revise the 
rule to comply with the manual.259 
New Hampshire’s APA has a variety of requirements that the notice 
must meet including: (1) a summary explaining the rule; (2) the fiscal im-
pact statement; (3) the person at the agency to contact regarding the rule; 
and (4) the deadline to submit written comments to the agency about the 
proposed rule.260  
New Hampshire law also requires agencies to have at least one public 
hearing on proposed rules.  The notice of the hearing must include the date 
of the hearing and must provide at least twenty days notice of the hear-
ing.261  The notice must also contain a statement by the agency that the 
proposed rules do not violate Part I, Article 28-as of the New Hampshire 
Constitution.262  This New Hampshire Constitutional provision prohibits 
the State from imposing new unfunded mandates on local communities.263  
If the notice submitted by the agency does not comply with these require-
ments, the Division can refuse to publish it.264  
The agency must provide notice, beyond the notice in the rulemaking 
register, to all persons regulated by the proposed rules who hold occupa-
tional licenses issued by the agency, and to all persons who have made 
  
 256. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:5. 
 257. Id. at § 541-A:5(IV)(e). 
 258. Id. at § 541-A:8, 12(I). The Division of Administrative Rules (“Division”) is the New Hamp-
shire state government office where all proposed and adopted administrative rules, subject to RSA 541-
A and the Administrative Procedure Act, must be filed by state executive branch agencies to make the 
adopted rules effective.  Together the effective agency rules comprise the New Hampshire Code of 
Administrative Rules. The Division also serves as the clerical and legal staff to the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Administrative Rules (JLCAR). 
 259. Id. at § 541-A:8. 
 260. Id. at § 541-A:6. 
 261. Id. at § 541-A:6(I).  
 262. Id. at § 541-A:6(I)(j). 
 263. Opinion of the Justices (Materials in Solid Waste Stream), 608 A.2d 870, 872 (N.H. 1992); 
Nashua School Dist. v. State, 667 A.2d. 1036, 1039-40 (N.H. 1995). 
 264. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:6(II). 
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timely request for advance notice of rulemaking proceedings.265  Upon 
request, the agency must also send notice to the President of the Senate, to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the Chairperson of the 
Fiscal Committee, and to the chairpersons of the legislative committees 
having jurisdiction over the subject matter.266  
After notice is provided, the agency holds the public hearing.  It must 
make the proposed rule available to the public at least five days prior to the 
hearing.267  At the hearing, the agency must “afford all interested persons 
reasonable opportunity to testify and the agency must also allow interested 
person to submit data, views, or arguments in writing” or in electronic 
format after the hearing.268 
After considering the received public comments and any comments 
made by the Division committee staff regarding the rules compliance with 
the New Hampshire Drafting and Procedural Manual for Administrative 
Rules, the agency develops and adopts a final proposed rule that is filed 
with the Division.269  This must be done within 150 days of publishing the 
notice in the rulemaking register.270  Part of the final rule proposal must 
include an amended fiscal impact statement explaining whether there is 
any change in the fiscal impact of the final rule as compared to the original 
proposed rule.271  
New Hampshire agencies do have to consider the public comments and 
testimony submitted during the process, but unlike federal law, they do not 
have to respond to comments or testimony unless an “interested person” 
requests the agency to “issue an explanation of the rule.”272  The agency’s 
explanation must provide a concise statement of the principal reasons for 
and against the rule and an explanation of why the agency overruled the 
arguments against the rule and decided to adopt the rule.273  
The rule then goes for review by the JLCAR.  JLCAR reviews agency 
regular rules to ensure that they are within the authority of the agency, con-
sistent with the intent of the legislation and in the public interest.274  
  
 265. Id. at § 541-A:6(III). The statute provides that notice to occupational licensees “shall be by U.S. 
Mail, agency bulletin or newsletter, public notice advertisement in a publication of daily statewide 
circulation, or in such other manner deemed sufficient by the committee.”  Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at § 541-A:11(IV)(d). 
 268. Id. at § 541-A:11.  The people with rulemaking authority for the agency must attend the hearing. 
If the agency’s rulemaking authority is with its governing board, then a quorum of the board must 
attend.  Id. at § 541-A:11(II).  
 269. Id. at § 541-A:12(I). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at § 541-A:12(II)(d). 
 272. Id. at § 541-A:11(VII). 
 273. Id. at § 541-A:11(VII)(a)-(b). 
 274. Id. at § 541-A:13(III). 
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JLCAR also examines rules to see if they will have a substantial economic 
impact that is not recognized in the fiscal impact statement.275  JLCAR 
serves a role that is similar to the OMB at the federal level.  One major 
difference between JLCAR and OMB is that JLCAR is part of the legisla-
tive branch, whereas OMB is part of the executive branch. 
JLCAR holds a public hearing on each rule it considers, and the public 
may comment on the rule at the hearing.276  After its review and hearing, 
JLCAR may decide to approve the rule as is, or conditionally approve the 
rule if the agency makes changes suggested by JLCAR, or it may object to 
the rule.277  
If JLCAR objects to the rule, it first makes a “preliminary objection” to 
the agency in writing.  Then the agency must respond in some way to the 
objection in writing prior to the Committee’s next regularly scheduled 
monthly meeting.  The agency may amend the rule to cure the defect and 
adopt the rule, or it may seek to adopt the rule without change, or it may 
withdraw the rule entirely.  If the agency does not respond prior to the 
Committee’s next meeting, then the rule is invalidated and the agency must 
start the rulemaking process all over again with a new rulemaking no-
tice.278  
After receiving the response from the agency, JLCAR may accept the 
response and withdraw the objection, or it may make a final objection by a 
majority vote of the entire JLCAR Committee.279  If the Committee files a 
final objection regarding the rule and the agency goes forward with the rule 
anyway, then the burden of proof shifts to the agency in any action for 
judicial review or for enforcement of the rule to establish that the part ob-
jected to is within the authority delegated to the agency, is consistent with 
the intent of the legislature, and is in the public interest. 280 
Rules that are approved by JLCAR and properly complete the other re-
quirements of the rulemaking process are considered to “be valid and bind-
ing on persons they affect [and] prima facie evidence of the proper inter-
pretation of the matter they refer to.” 281  As noted in Part III(F) of this 
article, New Hampshire statutes also provide JLCAR with the authority to 
recommend legislative action by sponsoring a “joint resolution.”  The 
  
 275. Id. at § 541-A:13(IV)(d). 
 276. Id. at § 541-A:2, 13. 
 277. Id.; New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 2.15-16. 
 278. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:13(V)(c); New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 2.15-
19. 
 279. There is also a process where an agency can request that JLCAR issue a revised objection.  This 
gives the agency a chance to address JLCAR’s concerns before JLCAR moves towards formal objec-
tion.  New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 2.18-19. 
 280. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:13(VI). 
 281. Id. at § 541-A:22(II). 
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sponsored “joint resolution” would invalidate the agency’s rule if approved 
by a majority vote of both the House and Senate and presented to the Gov-
ernor for approval or veto.282  
After the JLCAR review process runs its course, the agency may adopt 
the rule.  But the agency must file the final adopted rule with the Division 
for it to become effective.283  There are a variety of detailed statutory re-
quirements that the final rule must meet in order to be considered properly 
filed.284  If the Division determines that the rule meets these requirements, 
it issues a receipt to the agency and notice of the adopted rule is published 
in the New Hampshire Rulemaking Register.285  Rules become effective 
the day after they are filed with the Division.286  The agency then publishes 
an official version of the adopted rule.  All rules are published in hard copy 
and most rules are now available electronically.287  
If the Division determines that the final rule submitted by the agency 
does not meet the statutory requirements or other requirements delineated 
in the New Hampshire Drafting and Procedure Manual for Administrative 
Rules, then it can refuse to consider the rule as valid.288 
Most regular New Hampshire rules expire in eight years.289  The 
agency must readopt its rules before the expiration period or they become 
  
 282. Id. at § 541-A:13(VII). 
 283. The JLCAR process runs its course after:  
 
(a) The passage of 45 days from filing of a final proposal under RSA 541-A:12, I, or 60 
days from filing under RSA 541-A:12, I-a, without receiving notice of objection from the 
committee; (b) Receiving approval from the committee; (c) Written confirmation is sent to 
the agency by committee legal counsel relative to agency compliance with the committee’s 
conditional approval pursuant to RSA 541-A:13, V(a); (d) Passage of the 50-day period for 
committee review of the preliminary objection response, or revised objection response, if 
applicable, provided that the committee has not voted to sponsor a joint resolution pursuant 
to RSA 541-A:13, VII; or (e) Final legislative action, as defined in RSA 541-A:1, VI-a, is 
taken on the joint resolution sponsored pursuant to RSA 541-A:13, VII(b) or the passage of 
the 90 consecutive calendar days specified by RSA 541-A:13, VII(c), whichever occurs 
first. 
 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:14. 
 284. These include basic things like the name of the agency, the identification of the rule by number, 
the final rule being the same as the final proposed rule that went through the JLCAR process and the 
effective date of the rule if different from the standard effective date which is the day after filing. See 
id. at § 541-A:3-a; New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 2.21. 
 285. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:14(IV), 15. 
 286. Id. at § 541-A:14(VII), 16(III). 
 287. Id. at § 541-A:15(I). 
 288. See New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 2.21. The legal effect of the Division 
declining to accept a final rule for filing is a little unclear.  The Rulemaking manual acknowledges that 
only a court can declare a rule invalid.  The Rulemaking manual states that the Division’s actions 
would only indicate that the Division does not consider the rule to be valid or effective. As a result, the 
rule would not be issued as an effective rule by the Division, as other rules are.  Id. 
 289. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:17(I).  Rules of practice, procedure and organization do not expire 
unless a statute is adopted or amended in a way that renders these rules inaccurate.  If that occurs, the 
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invalid and unenforceable.  The readoption process is the same as the proc-
ess for initially adopting the rule. 
H. Agency Rulemaking Process – Interim and Emergency Rules 
New Hampshire also has “interim” and “emergency” rules.  Interim 
rules are generally used when an agency has to act quickly to conform to a 
new statutory requirement, to a court decision, or to a federal require-
ment.290  Agencies also adopt interim rules to prevent regular rules from 
expiring before the agency can complete the readoption process of the 
regular rule.  In other words, the interim rule has the same substance or 
content as the regular rule, and it just replaces the regular rule for a brief 
period of time to ensure that the issue or subject matter is still regulated by 
the agency.291 Interim rules may not remain in effect for more than 180 
days from the day they take effect.  They cannot be renewed or readopted 
as an interim rule.292 
Interim rules do not have to go through the public comment period 
with the agency, but the agency does have to provide public notice of the 
rule.293  Interim rules also have to comply with certain requirements in the 
New Hampshire Drafting and Procedure Manual for Administrative Rules 
and they must be filed with the Division.294 Interim rules also go through 
the JLCAR review process and the public does have an opportunity to 
comment on the proposed interim rule at the JLCAR hearing.295  Unlike 
regular rules, interim rules must actually be approved by JLCAR.296  An 
agency cannot go forward with the rule over a JLCAR final objection like 
it can with a regular rule.  
Emergency rules are permitted only when an agency finds that “an 
imminent peril to the public health or safety requires adoption of a rule 
with less notice than is required [for regular rules].”297  Emergency rules do 
not go through the same public notice and comment process as regular 
rules.  Rather, the agency need only “make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
emergency rules are made known by persons who may be affected by 
them.”298  They are filed with the Division, but do not go through the same 
  
rules expire one year after the effective date of the statute, unless the rules are amended, superseded or 
repealed.  Id. at § 541-A:16, 17(II). 
 290. Id. at § 541-A:19(I)(a)-(c). 
 291. Id. at § 541-A:19(I)(d). 
 292. Id. at § 541-A:19(X). 
 293. Id. at § 541-A:19(II)(a)-(b). 
 294. Id. at § 541-A:19(II)-(VIII). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at § 541-A:19(IX)-(X).   
 297. Id. at § 541-A:18(I). 
 298. Id. at § 541-A:18. 
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filing process as regular or interim rules.  The agency must include in its 
filing an explanation of the nature of the imminent peril to the public 
health or safety, including a summary of the effect upon the state if the 
emergency rule is not adopted.299  The Division publishes notice of the rule 
in the New Hampshire Rulemaking Register.  Emergency rules become 
effective upon filing.300  Like interim rules, emergency rules may not re-
main in effect for more than 180 days from the day they take effect.  They 
cannot be renewed or readopted as emergency rules.301 
Emergency rules do not go through the same JLCAR approval process 
as regular or interim rules.  JLCAR may not object to emergency rules.302  
JLCAR does review the agency’s statement of the reason the emergency 
rule is required and, it may petition the agency to repeal the rule if JLCAR 
finds the explanation inadequate or that the rule is not necessary.303  
I. Judicial Review of Rules 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has said that judicial review in-
cludes a responsibility to insure that administrative agencies do not substi-
tute their will for that of the legislature.304  To fulfill this function, the court 
examines agency rules substantively to determine if they are within the 
intended scope and purpose of the rulemaking power granted by the legis-
lature.305  
State statutes set some of the standards that the court must follow when 
reviewing agency rules.  For example, rules that are properly promulgated 
through the JLCAR and the Division process, mentioned in Parts III(G)-
(H) of this article, are considered “valid and binding [and] prima facie evi-
dence of the proper interpretation of the matter that they refer to.”306  
State statutes require the court to review rules that are promulgated by 
the agency over a JLCAR objection differently.  In that situation, the 
agency has the burden “of proving that the rules are within the agency’s 
delegated authority, consistent with the legislature’s intent, and in the pub-
lic interest.”307   
  
 299. Id. at § 541-A:18(III)(a)-(g). 
 300. New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 4.2. 
 301. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:19(X). 
 302. New Hampshire Manual, supra n. 249, at ch. 3 § 4.1-3. 
 303. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:18(IV) . 
 304. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 786. 
 305. In re N.H. Dept. of Transp., 883 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 2005); In re Anderson, 784 A.2d 1205, 
1206 (N.H. 2001). 
 306. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:22(II).  
 307. In re Toczko, 618 N.H. 800, 803 (N.H. 1992). 
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Much like the federal judicial review standards, New Hampshire courts 
will overturn an agency’s decision if it is clearly unreasonable or unlaw-
ful.308  But courts are not free to substitute their judgment on the wisdom of 
the rules for that of the agency.309  
Like the federal standard, New Hampshire courts review whether the 
agency’s rule “was fairly based on a consideration of all relevant fac-
tors.”310  The fact that an agency did not adopt suggestions made in com-
ments submitted to the agency during the rulemaking process does not 
suggest that it did not consider them.311  
Also, like the federal standards, the court provides administrative 
agencies with “substantial deference” when the rule involves the agency’s 
interpretation of a statutory requirement.312  New Hampshire courts often 
find the administrative agency’s interpretation to be persuasive.313  
State statutes provide that a party may challenge the validity or appli-
cability of an administrative rule through a declaratory judgment action in 
state superior court.314  A party may challenge an administrative rule on 
procedural grounds as well.  By statute, certain procedural deficiencies will 
prevent a rule from taking effect.  These include failing to file the rule with 
the Division or with JLCAR, or failing to respond to an objection by 
JLCAR.  Other procedural deficiencies do not affect the validity of the 
rule.315  These include failing to meet the style requirements in the admin-
istrative rulemaking manual and inadvertent failures to mail notice or cop-
ies of the rule.316  
For procedural violations not covered by statute, the court may fashion 
appropriate relief.317  The court, however, “will not set aside an agency's 
decision for a procedural irregularity . . . unless the complaining party 
shows material prejudice.”318  
  
 308. Denman, 419 A.2d at 1087. 
 309. In re Concord Nat. Gas Corp., 433 A.2d 1291, 1296 (N.H. 1981); LUCC v. Public Serv. Co. of 
N.H., 402 A.2d 626, 631 (N.H. 1979). 
 310. Concord Nat. Gas, 433 A.2d at 1296 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 
416). 
 311. Id. at 1296. 
 312. Hamby v. Adams, 376 A.2d 519, 521 (N.H. 1977). 
 313. N.H. Retirement System v. Sununu, 489 A.2d 615, 618 (N.H. 1985); N.H. Dept. of Rev. Admini-
stration v. Public Emp. Lab. Rel. Bd., 380 A.2d 1085, 1086 (N.H. 1977).  An agency’s interpretation of 
its regulations is also accorded great deference, but the court’s deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulations is not total.  The court still examines the agency’s interpretation to determine if it 
is consistent with the language of the regulation and with the purpose which the regulation is intended 
to serve.  In re Land Acquisition, 767 A.2d 948, 950-51 (N.H. 2000). 
 314. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:24. 
 315. Id. at § 541-A:23. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Concord Nat. Gas, 433 A.2d at 1295. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Both the Federal government and the New Hampshire government 
have promulgated administrative procedure acts in response to the expand-
ing importance of agencies in the day-to-day lives of citizens.  The New 
Hampshire administrative process parallels the structure of the federal ad-
ministrative process in many ways.  As noted in this article, however, the 
New Hampshire process differs from the federal process in some important 
instances.  It is important to be aware of the differences when dealing with 
New Hampshire agencies, or when navigating the New Hampshire rule-
making process. 
  
 
